Category Archives: Iraqi Kurdistan
Gazeteci Mutlu Çiviroğlu: ‘Biden yönetimiyle Türkiye’yi zor günler, Kürtleri yeni fırsatlar bekliyor’
Amerika’da tartışmalı Trump dönemi nihayet sona eriyor. Biden ve ekibi 20 Ocak’ta görevlerine başlarken, yeni süreçten Türkiye ve Kürtler’in beklentisi de oldukça fazla.
Amerika’da yaşayan gazeteci Mutlu Çiviroğlu’na göre, Biden yönetimiyle Türkiye’yi zor günler, Kürtleri ise yeni fırsatlar bekliyor.
Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri denetiminde Suriye Milli Ordusu (SMO) adı altında birleşen grupların son günlerde Suriye Demokratik Güçleri (SDG) denetimindeki Ayn İsa kentine yönelik saldırıları giderek artıyor.
TSK’nin bölgeye yönelik yeni bir askeri harekât başlatacağıyla ilgili değerlendirmeler artarken, dünyada olduğu gibi Rojavalı Kürtlerin de gözü kulağı bir nevi Amerika’da.
3 Kasım başkanlık seçimlerini kazanan Joe Biden, Trump’ın seçim sonuçlarını günlerce kabul etmemesi üzerine başlayan tartışmalar, ABD tarihinde ilki de beraberinde getirdi. 5 Ocak gününde ABD kongresi Trump taraftarları tarafından basıldı, olaylar çıktı.
Amerika demokrasi tarihine kara bir leke olarak geçen olayların ardından Trump’a yönelik tepkiler artarken, diğer yandan Biden’in yeni başkanlığı onaylandı. Biden ve ekibi 20 Ocak’ta artık resmen ABD’nin yönetimini devralacak.
ABD’de yaşanan gelişmeler kuşkusuz Türkiye kadar Kürtler tarafından da yakından takip ediliyor.
Yankılar’ın konuğu Amerika’da yaşayan gazeteci Mutlu Çiviroğlu’ydu. Gazeteci Civiroğlu ile Amerika’da son günlerde yaşananları, Biden ekibiyle olası Türkiye ilişkilerini, Rojavayı ve Kürtleri neyin beklendiğini masaya yatırdık.
“Amerika Türkiye’den müttefik gibi davranmasını isteyecektir. Bunu yaparken yeri geldiğinde sert olacaktır. Çünkü Biden’ın açıklamaları da biraz Erdoğan’ın anladığı dil şeklinde olduğu anlayışı var. Türkiye buna karşı büyükelçisini değiştirdi, olumlu mesajlar vermeye çalışıyor. Eğer gerçekten müttefiklik kavramına uygun faaliyetler olmazsa Türkiye için zor günler bekliyor diyebiliriz. Tabi, Türkiye’nin hala resmen Amerika’nın müttefiki olduğunu da unutmamamız gerekiyor. Amerikan’ın Türkiye ile ilişkilere önem verdiğini unutmamız lazım. Her iki ülkenin ekonomik ve askeri ilişkiler var. Trump, S-400 yaptırım konusunda sonuna kadar yaptırımları bekletmişti. Biden başkanlığındaki yönetim bu konuyu takip edecektir. S-400 meselesi Amerikan devletini çok rahatsız etmiş durumda. Türkiye’nin bu konuda bir çözüm bulması lazım. Ya resti çekip satmıyorum ya da S-400’leri elinden çıkarması lazım. Bunun ara formülü yok. Şimdiye kadar Trump Kongreyi oyalamıştı. Bu opsiyon da artık kalmayacak. Türkiye’nin S-400 konusunu netleştirmesi gerekiyor.
Kongre’nin herhangi bir konuda mutabık kalması çok zor ama Türkiye’ye ceza konusunda her iki parti de hemfikir olmuştu. Türkiye’nin cezalandırılması ve yaptırıma maruz kalmamışı gerektiği her iki tarafından da çabasıyla geçmişti. Bunun hayata geçirilmemesi nedeni Trump-Erdoğan arasındaki özel ilişkiden dolayıydı. Kongre’nin yaptırım kararları yeni dönemde yeri geldiğinde uygulanacaktır. Biden çok daha sert olacaktır. Türkiye ve Erdoğan’ın yaptıkları konusunda daha sert tavır takınacağını söylüyor zaten.
Yeni yönetim Türkiye’den net bir tutum isteyecektir. Türkiye’yi S-400’ler konuda çok zor günler bekliyor. Buradaki hava böyle.
Biden ile birlikte Amerika’nın Suriye, Irak, Afganistan’daki varlığı, Almanya, Polonya, küresel varlığı daha net hala gelecek. Amerika tekrar NATO- BM tekrardan önceki rolüne dönüş yapacaktır.
Biden’in kendisi Türkiye çok iyi tanıyan bir siyasetçi. Kürtlerle ilişkileri var. Irak Kürdistan Bölgesiyle ilişkileri iyi, oraya gitmişti. Kürtlere sempatisi olduğu biliniyor. Hatta ‘Kürtlerin tek dostu dağlar değil, biz de dostuz’ diye açıklamaları var. İrlandalı geçmişini sahiplenen biri.
Biden’ın yönetiminde Ulusal güvenlik danışmanı, Dışişleri Bakanı ve en son Brett McGurk’un da ulusal güvenlik ekibinde Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika Koordinatörlüğünden sorumlu olacağı bilgisi de geldi. McGurk Kürt kamuoyunun yakından bildiği sevdiği bir isim.
Tüm bunları bir araya koyduğumuzda, hem Türkiye ve Erdoğan’ı hem Türkiye’deki Kürt sorunun önemini bilen, Suriye’deki Kürtlere önem biçen, Irak Kürdistan bölgesindeki Kürtlerle ilişkileri olan bir yönetimi göreceğiz. Bu da Kürtler açısından birtakım fırsatlar doğuruyor.
Washington karar mekanizması, dünya siyaseti için önemli bir adres. Kürtler buradaki varlıklarını güçlendirdikleri taktirde buradaki siyasete etki etme şansı da olabilir. Bu yeni hükümet çünkü Kürtleri tanıyor, biliyor. Biden yönetimiyle Amerika askerlerin Rojava’daki varlığı netleşecektir. Eğer Kürtler varolan fırsatları kullanabilirlerse askeri ilişkiyi diplomatik siyasi ilişkiye dönüştürme potansiyeli yakalayabilirler. Bu kendi durumlarına bağlı. Türkiye ile ilişkiler mevcut haliyle devam etmeyeceği için Kürtlere fırsat doğuruyor. Hem Biden hem de Biden ekibinden kendilerini tanıyan insanların olmasından dolayı Kürtler açısından avantajlı fırsatlar doğurabilir. Bu da Kürtlerin bu fırsatları kullanacak araçları yakalamasına bağlı.
Nirxandinên min yên ser rewşa heyî li Washingtonê,hilhijartin, Trump, Biden, Kongres…
SDF has maintained its unity even in the face of Turkish occupation – US Middle East Analyst
Syrian Democratic Forces (North Press)
(North Press) – The Kurdish National Congress of North America (KNCNA), a nonprofit organization founded in 1988 focused on Kurdish rights and the attainment of an independent Kurdistan, held an online seminar on North and East Syria titled “Where’s Rojava Today?” on Saturday. The seminar’s panelists included Syrian Democratic Council Representative to the US Sinam Muhammad, Middle East Scholar Dr. Amy Austin Holmes, Rojava Activist and KNCNA Member Dr. Ihsan Efrini, and Kurdish Journalist and Analyst Mutlu Civiroglu.
The organization has been organizing conferences since 1988, and wanted to organize a conference in Washington, but “because of [coronavirus], we couldn’t go ahead, therefore we thought about a webinar,” Ihsan Efrini, a native of Afrin currently residing in Canada, told North Press. “In 2019, Rojava was trending, but it seems like people have forgotten the region. There is still a lot happening in the region that needs to be talked about,” he added about the need for such a conference to take place.
Sinam Muhammad opened the discussion by talking about the dissolution of the Syrian opposition and the invasion and occupation of her native Afrin. “Afrin was a painful moment not only for Afrinis, but for all people in Syria, and also Arabs. They felt that they were also under attack and worried about Turkish intervention in Syria, and this is what Turkey did [in Sere Kaniye and Tel Abyad].” Muhammad went on to discuss the completion of the first stage of the intra-Kurdish dialogue, stating, “It was so good that we reached an agreement together with the help of the United States, and I would like to thank Mr. William Roebuck this effort.” She added, “it is good for Kurdish parties to have unity…in order to have a stronger administration and stronger political solution to present to the future constitutional committee of Syria.”
Dr. Amy Holmes discussed several subjects, chief among them the unity of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as one of its key characteristics from which it draws its strength. “The SDF is a multi-ethnic force…and a multi-religious force, with Muslims, Christians, and Yezidis,” said Dr. Holmes, who previously completed a thorough and comprehensive study on the SDF in all regions of northeastern Syria.
“When Turkey invaded in October 2019…many people thought that the SDF would disintegrate, or that, for example, the Arabs in the SDF would defect – that they would go back to the regime with Assad, or that they would join Turkey…but really, nothing like that happened. There [were] no major defections within the SDF as the result of the Turkish intervention,” Holmes explained, later telling a personal anecdote about an Arab individual from Sere Kaniye who joined the SDF in 2015, as well as mentioning Kurds who joined the SDF to liberate Arab-majority areas such as Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. “The SDF has maintained its unity even in the face of this Turkish aggression,” she continued.
Mutlu Civiroglu further commented on the talks, saying that “the initiative has brought a very optimistic atmosphere to the region…[it] has caused happiness among the people: activists, local people, military people, and politicians.” Civiroglu also mentioned local concern about the Caesar Act, saying “the other major topic in the region was the Caesar Act, and its impacts on the region under the Syrian Democratic Council or Syrian Democratic Forces’ control – how will the region be protected?”
The seminar lasted around an hour and a half, with each panelist sharing their views and answering viewer’s questions in the end. Many topics, including the intra-Kurdish negotiations, entry of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq-based Rojava Peshmerga into Rojava, the Turkish occupations of Afrin, Serekaniye, and Tel Abyad, and the efforts and unity of the Syrian Democratic Forces, were discussed during the meeting.
Reporting by Lucas Chapman
Iraq Protests – Turkey Incursion into Syria
Host Carol Castiel and Mutlu Civiroglu, senior broadcaster in VOA’s Kurdish Service, talk with Abbas Kadhim, Director of the Iraq Initiative at the Atlantic Council, about the ramifications of widespread protests against corruption and lack of services that have shaken Iraq over the past weeks. Kadhim also addresses Ankara’s incursion into northeastern Syria after US President Donald Trump told Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that Washington would withdraw 1,000 troops from the region, leaving Kurdish allies in the lurch and scrambling strategic alliances.
A ticking time bomb: Meeting the ISIS women of al-Hol
A woman at al-Hol camp in Syria. Image: Mutlu Civiroglu
A pregnant woman was reportedly beaten to death this week in a Syrian refugee camp housing tens of thousands of people displaced by the war against Islamic State where they live among the militants’ wives and children in conditions described by international agencies and reporters who have visited the camp as harsh, dire, and even apocalyptic.
The woman, identified as 30-year-old Sodermini by ANHA news agency, was six months pregnant, and originally from Indonesia. On July 28, her body was discovered in a tent and taken to a hospital run by the Kurdish Red Crescent, where an autopsy determined she had suffered tremendously before she died.
The Indonesian government said it is investigating the circumstances of her death, and the woman is believed to be among about 50 Indonesian adherents to Islamic State living among about 70,000 people in the camp. It’s not known yet who killed her or why.
Children have died in the camp, and the International Committee of the Red Cross said recently that, despite the efforts of international NGOs to treat people with war wounds, infections, or who are suffering from malnutrition, the humanitarian needs in al-Hol remain “tremendous.”
Last month, Kurdish analyst and journalist Mutlu Civiroglu visited al-Hol camp and other areas managed by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, the de facto government in northern and eastern Syria. He found al-Hol to be a “ticking time bomb” – dangerously overcrowded, too large for the Kurdish internal security police force called the Asayish to control, and full of children deeply at risk of becoming the next generation of ISIS fighters.
The interview has been edited for length and clarity.
Women walk in al-Hol camp in Syria in July 2019. Image: Mutlu Civiroglu
The Defense Post: To start, tell me about the camps. Who runs them? How many people are there –how many women, men and children? How many are believed to be ISIS adherents and their families? How many are civilians?
Mutlu Civiroglu: According to the U.N. over 70,000 people live in al-Hol Camp. UNICEF estimates that more than 90% of them are children and women. Nearly 20,000 of the children are Syrians. According to Kurdish officials I spoke with, in total there are about 30,000 ISIS women and their children from 62 different countries. They are mainly in al-Hol but also in Ain Issa and Roj camps.
The whole of al-Hol camp is very crowded. Over 70,000 people live there. Considering the very hot summer, the camp residents live under very tough circumstances.
We were there one day when it was very hot. The sewage water was outside, on the surface – a very unhygienic environment and invitation for disease and illness. There are not enough doctors or health centers, according to the people we spoke to.
Security-wise it’s very risky because it’s over-crowded, hard to control. A few weeks ago an Asayish officer was stabbed. A 14-year-old Azeri girl was killed because she was not covering her hair, according to the people on the ground. I had to go to the camp with strong protection after this incident. It’s like a ticking bomb. The Kurdish administration runs the camp but UNICEF [the U.N. children’s agency], UNHCR [the U.N. refugee agency], the Red Cross, World Health Organization, and other intergovernmental organizations are there to support them, from what I could see.
Abdulkarim Omar, head of foreign relations in Jazira canton, told me that including Syrians and Iraqis there a total of 30,000 ISIS women and children under their control and around 12,000 are foreigners (muhajirs) and 8,000 of them are children. Of course male suspected ISIS members are kept in prison in different locations. Currently some 6,000 ISIS fighters are under SDF control: 5,000 are Iraqi and Syrian, and the other 1,000 are foreigners from 55 different states.
TDP: How are they separated?
The ISIS families are separated from the rest of the Iraqis and Syrians. There are wires separating them from the rest of the refugee community in the camp, and their location is known by the security and Asayish forces.
TDP: Do they live more or less freely within the camp or are their schedules and movements restricted?
The camp residents were allowed to go out for shopping until recently, but several escape incidents took place, and some ISIS women were taken out by smugglers, so the camp administration recently banned residents from going out. Instead they set up a new market inside of the camp, called Baghuz market. The administration is more strict now.
Their movements have to be restricted because of the killings. I was told the Russian women did that [killing of a 14-year-old Azeri girl] – by Russian I mean women from Chechnya, Dagestan, the Muslim republics of Russia – so their movements are more restricted and security is tightened after these incidents. Some camp residents have complained that because they’re not allowed out of the camp, the prices became more expensive and they’re having a hard time living because things are more expensive now. But they also acknowledge that by the mistake of some of the ISIS wives they’re all suffering.
I was told that kids are encouraged by women to throw stones at the camp officials. This also creates pressure on the security forces to be more careful.
TDP: What is the food and water supply like? Medicine? Sanitation? Are international organisations helping with humanitarian needs?
Based on what I saw I think there is enough water, but because the camp is overcrowded it causes problems especially with the water and in the summer. The Red Cross, WHO and UNHCR are there to provide help in addition to the Kurdish administration. They are also in-camp hospitals and health centers being built and mobile health centers set up by the Kurdish Red Crescent, so I don’t think there is a very desperate need, but because of the large number of residents I’m sure from time to time food and water is becoming a problem. International organizations and the local government are there trying to do their best.
However, Kurdish officials are asking for more support from the international community in terms of medicine, hospitals, water and cleaning materials. They also want countries to take back their citizens so that the population of the camp will be reduced.
TDP: There were some reports recently that some women escaped – do you know how? What is internal security like?
I was told the same thing and also read that some people in the Asayish are involved in taking the women out of the camps, but Kurdish officials strongly denied that and said it’s propaganda and their members would never be involved in such a thing because money is nothing for them, and they do this because of their values.
But the way different sources explained it to me is this: The women were allowed to leave the camp before for shopping, and since they all have the black burqa on, they look alike, and when they leave, they never come back because their families arrange a smuggler who is waiting for them in the town. Once these women go out of the camp they change their clothes and they are smuggled out. Since the camp is very large it’s not possible to have 100% control. That’s why the camp administration has now stopped allowing the women to leave for shopping. According to sources it’s arranged by families who pay a large amount of money to smugglers.
Internal security is tight. There are many Asayish forces guarding the camp, and the main gate is also a checkpoint. Before you reach the camp you pass through several checkpoints on the road from Hasakah. After you enter the main gate there’s another gate that’s also well-protected, and visitors are strictly controlled. When you’re inside they give you protection so stabbing incidents won’t happen. With me I think there were four people guarding us.
But again, because of the large area and a huge number of residents it’s not very easy to control the camp, and since you don’t know what’s inside of the tents or what kind of weapons they might have it’s not 100% safe or secured.
Authorities in the al-Hol camp in Syria set up a market called Baghuz in an attempt to counter the smuggling of female ISIS adherents. Image: Mutlu Civiroglu
TDP: Do the families seem to be repentant?
I observed mixed feelings. Some were defiant; for example an Egyptian woman was cursing us. She was using bad language and was very aggressive towards us, and was chanting pro-ISIS slogans. Also Russian-origin ISIS wives were very aggressive, so you see that they’re very motivated by what they’re doing. Some Turkish ISIS families seemed defiant, but at the same time I saw some Azeri women look very regretful. They seemed willing to go back home.
One Tajik woman showed me drawings by her child, saying her son drew their home and they want to go home. And you see people saying they were deceived, especially Dutch and Belgian ISIS wives, they say they believed everyone was equal but realized that the rich lived better lives, and the emirs paid money to smuggle their families out of Baghuz before the SDF took control, but these women ended up in these camps in very tough circumstances.
They were criticizing Baghdadi, saying he was in Libya living a good life but they are like this [in al-Hol], and they want their countries to take them back. When I pressured ed them, saying they had many opportunities to leave and that they came to Syria willingly, they said they are ready to be in prison in their countries, but at least their children would not live in camp conditions. They hoped even when they are in prison, their families will be able to take care of children. They were well-aware that they might spend long years in prison, which I found very interesting.
Because of the tough circumstances in the camp I think going home is a common desire. But to me the most important thing was that the vast majority of the camp residents are children, and especially children under 12. They are on the dirt, they play in dusty alleys – no playground, no sanitizing, under the sun – I think no child should be living under those circumstances, no matter what their parents did. Children have nothing to do with this, so they need to be given the opportunity to play and be a child, to flourish. They need help to get out of this trauma and be de-radicalized and rehabilitated, and the camp is no place for that. They need expert support and psychological support.
I am hoping that the governments will understand that children desperately need help, because if they stay there they will be brainwashed by their mothers. In a few years these children are going to be core ISIS members, so there’s a danger waiting for societies if these kids are not helped as soon as possible.
TDP: Do you think there’s a realistic possibility of a tribunal? Why in North and East Syria rather than the International Criminal Court, or trials in Iraq for foreigners, as with some French citizens who already have been sentenced? The Autonomous Administration isn’t recognized as a government, so how would sentences or verdicts given by the tribunal have any force in international law?
The Autonomous Administration feels like they’re under pressure because there are thousands of ISIS fighters, their wives and children. It’s a heavy burden for them to carry so they need the international community to help them. Especially after the Turkish statements about a military operation inside Syria, there are concerns that such a move may help these people to flee from the prisons and camps. But so far very few countries have taken back their citizens so the problem remains on Kurds’ shoulders and they feel like they need to do something.
The idea of an international tribunal is a step in this direction to push the international community to do more to share the burden with them.
Currently the administration is not recognized officially but a tribunal can be different. The legal experts in International Forum on ISIS conference agreed that there is a base for establishing a tribunal in Rojava because there is already a judicial system, legal experts, lawyers and with the support of the international community a tribunal could be established and it would be a good way to start to find a solution to the huge problem of post-caliphate ISIS.
Again, there are thousands of fighters under SDF control, many of their wives, and tens of thousands of children and they feel like they need to do something because so far the international community is turning a blind eye to the issue.
The caliphate was ended in March. Western countries are not open to the idea to expatriate their citizens. So the problem is with Rojava, with the Syrian Kurds. The attacks show the gravity of the situation, and since nothing is being done, Kurds and their allies feel like they need to take the initiative.
Iraq is motivated to do that in a way to clear its name that was ruined when it was overrun by ISIS. The Iraqi army fled from ISIS and left it for them. But at the same time, Iraq is also driven by the idea of revenge. Numerous ISIS members have already been executed.
The system in Rojava is more progressive and closer to Western systems and it is a better location for an international court because most of the fight was done in Syria. The caliphate’s heart was in Raqqa. Manbij is where the attacks against the West were planned. Kobani is where ISIS was first defeated and ISIS’s unstoppable advance was first prevented. Baghuz was the last remaining stronghold of the caliphate. They’re all in Syria. And the SDF, YPG, YPJ, Syriac Military Council are there so Syria is more suitable than Iraq considering these people have done the work, they have paid the highest price. These people defeated ISIS.
A security gate separates the families from ISIS fighters from displaced Syrians and Iraqis at al-Hol camp. Image: Mutlu Civiroglu
TDP: Are there plans to help the victims of ISIS?
There are some orphanages for the Yazidi children, de-radicalization centers for Yazidi children and other ISIS children, and some villages for Yazidi women who were not accepted back by their communities, but the resources are very limited in the Kurdish parts of Syria. Finances, expert advice and equipment are limited, so there has to be external support. The West especially should step in because the problem is very serious and requires a joint effort by Kurds and the West, especially the countries that are members of the international Coalition. The camps have the support of the international, humanitarian organizations but mainly Kurds are running them. There are great efforts, but it’s not enough.
TDP: Do you see any sign that the International Forum on ISIS conference has influenced foreign countries to change their Syria policies? Will they leave troops in the north, will they take their citizens back?
Such international forums are good venues to understand what’s happening on the ground and hear what people people on the ground – activists, experts, military and political leadership – say. It’s very important. There were representatives from the U.S., France, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other European countries, as well as South Africa. It’s important that people from different backgrounds come and learn about the situation in Syria, ISIS captives, operations against ISIS families, and also share with the local people what their countries think about it. So it’s a good platform for them, and when these people go back they talk to the public, media and think-tanks. I’m optimistic that they’ll have an impact in their own countries.
I think the countries that have a military presence in northern and eastern Syria will continue; I don’t foresee any significant change in the plans of these countries, specifically the U.S., France, Germany and others. They’ll be there because they all know the ISIS threat is not fully resolved yet. The caliphate is ended but the danger, the ideology is there, the support base is there, sleeper cells are there. CENTCOM Commander Kenneth McKenzie and Ambassador William Roebuck’s recent visit shows that the Coalition gives the same importance to Rojava.
The world has almost forgotten Syria. International foreign policy priorities change so rapidly that Syria does not have the same spot it used to have, but ISIS is a global problem and it hasn’t been fully resolved. The resolution needs a global effort. Taking back citizens from Syria is one way of doing that, because the more people who stay there, the more is it is a ticking bomb.
All countries should repatriate their citizens, and they should try these people in their countries. If not, they should support the idea of helping to set up a tribunal in Rojava so that these people can be brought to justice and pay the price for the atrocities they committed. But I think the world is still turning a blind eye, although recently I see more awareness in terms of countries taking back at least the women and children and sentencing them in their own countries instead of keeping them in Syria.
ISIS’s ‘caliphate’ was crushed. Now Syria’s Kurd-led alliance faces bigger battles
Reporting from shattered Syria in the dying days of the caliphate, Jared Szuba talks to Kurds and Arabs about the fight for their shared future
SDF fighters in Baghuz, Syria in March 2019. Image: Jared Szuba for The Defense Post
In the last days of Islamic State’s professed caliphate, under the cover of thunder and heavy rain, Coalition aircraft bombed an ammunition depot south of the Syrian village of Baghuz.
The detonation touched off a cluster of fires in the cult’s densely-inhabited encampment.
The next morning, more than one thousand of the remaining believers gathered at the foot of Mount Baghuz to surrender to the alliance of Syrian militias that surrounded them on three fronts. To their south lay the Euphrates riverbank, within range of the Syrian Arab Army across the water.
For weeks their tents had been raked with automatic fire, their zealous mujahideen picked off by the polished snipers of the predominantly Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). Each night, their dugouts and shelters were slammed from all sides with American and French 155mm artillery and 120mm SDF mortars.
“Strike and wait, strike and wait,” a stocky Syrian Democratic Forces conscript told me at the base of the cliff. The progress was grueling. “We’re advancing, but can’t with the civilians in front,” he said.
Every few days the jihadists called for an evacuation, and the main assault halted. But sniper operations continued, cadre said, to prevent them from exploiting the quasi-ceasefire.
“They send the civilians out then they stay. We keep telling them, ‘Whoever doesn’t surrender, dies.’”
Behind him, a procession of black veils shuffled up the path, contrasting with the sandy bluff illuminated by the setting sun. They clung to dirty children, some crying.
A lanky teenager with a Kalashnikov gestured to the bags born by one of the black forms. Without hesitation, she jettisoned the luggage down the cliff.
“That’s the last group!” someone shouted in Arabic. A gang of fighters shouldered their rifles and jumped off sandbags, skidding and jogging down the gravel path towards the front. One told me to leave the area. “It’s going to begin again any minute.”
I legged it back to the van and climbed in. Half a football field ahead, two American-made Humvees bearing the yellow flag of the SDF squatted before of a one-story concrete home.
On the roof, silhouetted against the sun through palm fronds, two fighters extended the bipod of a PKM with casual proficiency. As we pulled away, the crackle of small arms fire broke out, then grew into a steady rhythm. A Dushka chugged away somewhere behind.
“Their resistance is softening,” said Haval Ahmed, my 20-year old escort.
“It’ll probably end within days.”
A YPJ fighter watches as people surrender to SDF colleagues in ISIS-held Baghuz, Syria in March 2019. Image: Jared Szuba for The Defense Post
The ground war against Islamic State has been declared finished. Coalition bombs are still pounding the last stragglers holed up under the south face of the cliff.
At a safe house a few kilometers north of the front, veteran SDF fighters told me Baghuz had been the most taxing fight of their war against ISIS.
“Honestly when we came here, we expected a big battle. But not these enormous numbers,” Mervan Qamishlo of the SDF’s Military Media Command said.
As we spoke, the ostensible caliphate that had once stretched nearly from Aleppo to Baghdad was being measured in square meters.
Already synonymous with savagery, the death cult nearly outdid itself in its last stand. Women and children returned fire on the SDF, an officer at the front said, and at least one surrendered mujahid said their leaders were withholding food from those who refused to fight.
The day after I arrived, a delegation of black-veiled suicide bombers mingled with the evacuees only to detonate among their own, wounding a handful of SDF guards.
Veteran jihadists from Anbar, Afghanistan, Chechnya and Turkey commanded the last of the believers, Mervan Qamishlo told me.
The hardened cadre had slipped past the Iraqi Army at Mosul and the YPG in Manbij, fled Raqqa and pulled back across the desert plain of Deir Ezzor, Hajin, and Sousa under catastrophic bombardment.
But if Daesh’s “elite” had concentrated in Baghuz, the same was true for their adversaries.
With every city the fanatics fled over the past four-and-a-half years, they surrendered thousands of their able-bodied survivors to a confederation of Western-backed militias that promised revenge, and a place in a new Syria.
SDF continues ISIS clearing operations inside Baghuz, Syria on March 20, 2019. Image: Mutlu Civiroglu/@mutludc/Twitter
Detachments from the YPG, its all-female counterpart the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), and the Syriac, Manbij, and Deir Ezzor Military Councils, as well as former Free Syrian Army factions such as the Liwa al-Shamal al-Dimokrati (Northern Democratic Brigade) and Jaysh al-Thuwar (Army of Revolutionaries), congregated for the final thrust of the war. (That SDF representatives in Baghuz could not account for all units participating signalled both the unity and urgency of their cause.)
Salih, a 20-year-old self-professed forward observer from Hasakah, had joined the YPG three years earlier “to fight terrorism.” We spoke on the roof of the house, overlooking miles of ruins that stretched from the Euphrates to the Iraq border.
After Baghuz, he said, he wanted “to go home.”
“We’ve finished the end of the road,” Salih, an Arab who previously had been affiliated with a Sunni rebel group, said. He stared over the sunlit battlefield with a sharp, empty gaze.
“This is the end of Daesh … We’ve liberated ourselves from terrorism inshahallah,” he said”We want a homeland so we can just live in security.”
For others, the fight was far from over.
Inside the house, a group of tired recruits just back from the front huddled on the floor scooping heaps hot rice and chicken from styrofoam trays.
I asked what they expected next after Baghuz. They hesitated, keeping their eyes on the food. A burly fighter in his late twenties took the opportunity to speak for them.
“We’ve had enough of war,” he said. He gave his name as Salaheddin.
A five-year YPG veteran who fought at al-Hol, al-Shaddadi, Manbij, Raqqa, and other battles – more than he could now recall – Salaheddin was on his third tour of the Deir Ezzor campaign.
“We’d love to rest,” he said, before adding, “we have much work ahead. Daesh isn’t finished. There are a lot of sleeper cells.”
“After we finish with the sleeper cells,” he paused, then gave a sly grin. “I’m not able to talk about that.”
YPG fighters YPG on Mount Baghuz overlooking the evacuation of ISIS civilians. Image: Jared Szuba for The Defense Post
Threat of Turkish invasion
The SDF declared Saturday it has taken a staggering 32,000 casualties in the conflict. If accurate, the losses are more than half the Pentagon’s estimate of its current forces. 11,000, including civilian volunteers who took up arms in Kobane and Efrin, are believed to have died.
The half-decade war against the Islamist genocidaires will one day be seen as the easy part, northern Syrian officials told The Defense Post.
To the north of their nascent territory, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is openly vowing a military assault to destroy the YPG and to purge its political arm, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), from local governance and re-settle hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees into Kurdish-majority areas in the north.
YPG officials, some known to be former members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), have long sought to distance the Syrian project from the insurgent group, but Turkey isn’t buying it.
The Washington establishment may have called Erdogan’s bluff on an invasion for now, but northern Syrian officials are taking the threats very seriously. In 2017, Turkey launched an incursion into Efrin that displaced hundreds of thousands of people, mainly Kurds, in an act yet to be labeled by any international body as an ethnic cleansing.
YPG graffiti in eastern Syria in March 2019. Image: Jared Szuba for The Defense Post
To the south, Syrian Defense Minister Ali Abdullah Ayoub last week reiterated his government’s demands for the north’s total capitulation and reintegration into the pre-war Baathist system, under which Kurds were denied citizenship for decades.
A regime assault would “only lead to more losses, destruction and difficulties for the Syrian people,” the SDF responded.
The Kremlin, having offered to mediate a favorable outcome for the north, now say they can do little to sway Assad, northern Syrian officials say.
Within their current borders, the conflict has dumped tens of thousands of ISIS prisoners and their families into under-prepared internment camps. Northern Syrian authorities are now calling for U.N.-led and financed international tribunal to be held in Rojava (the Kurdish name for majority-Kurdish lands in northern Syria), their previous requests for the repatriation of foreign fighters mostly ignored.
Without formal international recognition, heavy artillery, armor or aircraft, the fledgling province’s fate may be largely out of its leaders’ hands for now.
Democratic project in northern Syria
In the meantime, northern Syrian authorities are managing matters within their control.
“We have defeated ISIS militarily. Now, we must do so ideologically,” said SDF media chief Mustafa Bali.
The north’s security institutions are set to be reorganized to focus on internal security operations. Officials are tight-lipped about details, but both the SDF and Asayish, or police forces, have already received new training programs focusing on hunting ISIS sleeper cells and dealing with explosives.
The U.S. Defense Department has requested $300 million in the 2020 budget for “vetted Syrian opposition” partners, including increased outfitting of northern Syria’s internal security forces and $250 million to support “border security requirements” of partner forces.
“Fighting at the front is different than the internal battle,” Aldar Xelil, senior TEV-DEM foreign affairs official, explained to me in Qamishli.
“The sleeper cells are considered the hardest phase. Harder than the phase we are undertaking now,” Mervan told me in Baghuz, as gunfire rattled in the distance.
Shouldering the weight will be the Asayish and internal intelligence services. But the vanguard against whatever remains of ISIS or its ideology will be the population of northern Syria itself, officials say.
People leave their belongings behind as they surrender from ISIS-held territory to SDF fighters in Baghuz, Syria in March 2019. Image: Jared Szuba for The Defense Post
There is a perception among many northern Syrians that segments of region’s Sunni Arab population are now more religiously conservative after living years under Islamic State, so the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria has instituted an ambitious education campaign to break down what they see is a toxic mixture of Sunni Arab chauvinism and Assadist authoritarianism.
“For 50 years this region was indoctrinated with the racism of Arab nationalism under the Baath party,” Bali said. Sectarianism, officials say, is ingrained in the Syrian constitution, legal code, and culture.
“This generation must learn and be raised [knowing] there are others such as Kurds, others such as Syriacs, others such as Christians, and it’s their right to live like you,” Bali said.
“Hussein and Mu’awiya,” early Islamic figures associated with the roots of the Sunni-Shia split, “are gone,” Bali said. “They’re dead. We need to learn how to live together.”
They will need to proceed cautiously.
The PYD’s social policies have already incurred protest in some majority-Arab areas, such as Raqqa and Deir Ezzor. Their enforcement of mandatory conscription for men and moves against political opponents have earned them some detractors among the Kurdish population.
“Every new project is met with violent reaction,” Bali told me. Nonetheless, officials say they are confident Syria’s disparate sects will embrace their stated goal of secular democratic confederalism – and a society in which women wield significant authority – once properly exposed to it.
“Society needs to breathe the oxygen of life,” Bali said. “The educational system can rescue future generations from war, from sectarian war.”
“We want to remove the barriers between nationalisms and religions,” Xelil said.
“We’re seeing a lot of progress … but we still need much time.”
They may not have it.
‘Multiple parties, not multiple armies’
The Pentagon’s reassuring gestures to the SDF belie the deeper crisis: that American diplomats have not yet found a force sufficient to replace the more than 2,000 U.S. troops maintaining stability in the north.
Nor have they found an appropriate force to man the Turkish border. Nor have they made northern Syrian officials any promises.
A residual presence of a few hundred American troops is not remotely adequate to accomplish either, former U.S. defense and national security officials say.
The Syria-Turkey border in March 2019. Image: Jared Szuba for The Defense Post
Northern Syrian officials have called for an international force for border protection against Turkey, and continue to receive sympathetic reassurances from the French and British.
But the Europeans say they cannot commit to a mission not led by a sizeable U.S. force. Even if American officials could wheedle Trump up to leaving, say, 1,000 residual troops, they still appear not to have an exit strategy to offer their western allies.
James Jeffrey, Washington’s pointman on the crisis, downplayed the dilemma last Friday.
“We’re not really looking to a coalition being peacekeepers or anything like that … We’re asking coalition personnel to continue to contribute and to up their D-ISIS operations, and we’re getting a pretty good response initially,” Jeffrey said.
US Ambassador James F. Jeffrey swears in as Special Representative for Syria Engagement, at the US Department of State on August 17, 2018. Image: US State Dept/Ron Przysucha
Meanwhile, Jeffrey’s team is seeking local Syrian forces to guard the border in order to “meet everybody’s needs.”
So far that has proven elusive. Turkey rejects any YPG presence on the border, a position Jeffrey endorsed last week. “We don’t want another Qandil in Syria,” Jeffrey said, referring to the PKK headquarters in northern Iraq.
“We need defense against Turkey, not the other way around,” a northern Syrian source with knowledge of the discussions said.
Publicly, officials from the SDF’s political arm, the Syrian Democratic Council, say they believe Jeffrey’s team is working on their behalf, and that they can understand the U.S.’s strategic concerns as Turkey flirts with Moscow.
Privately, there are frustrations. Jeffrey is perceived as ingratiating to an erratic and duplicitous supposed NATO ally using the YPG issue as a political steam-valve.
Indeed the American team appears to be waiting out Turkey’s regional elections, set for March 31, to plan the next move.
The friction may well be mutual. Northern Syrian officials reject the veteran diplomat’s proposals to bring in at least two exiled Syrian militia forces, the Rojava Peshmerga and the Syrian Elite Forces (the latter affiliated with Syrian opposition leader Ahmed Jarba), to secure the Turkish border.
“Not possible,” Xelil told me. “First of all, Jarba doesn’t have the forces. Secondly, to those who liberated this region and administrate it, there’s no place for Jarba in this whole project. Where did this come from? It’s not possible.”
The Elite Forces’ brief cooperation with and integration into the SDF in 2016 and 2017 was seen as a political win for the Kurdish-led administration, but they fell out during the battle of Raqqa in 2017.
The Rojava Peshmerga is aligned with the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria, a political rival of the PYD closely linked to its namesake in Iraq.
“The [Rojava] Peshmerga,” Xelil said, “is a red line.” He accuses the force of being trained and funded by Turkey. “How can we trust them?”
Importing rival forces with unclear allegiances will only complicate matters, northern Syrian officials said, at a time when the SDF is striving to unify its own various components.
“Democracy means multiple parties, not multiple armies,” the source said.
“We don’t see this as in the best interest of North and East Syria’s security,” the source said, speaking to The Defense Post on the condition of anonymity.
The American team is set to discuss its “initial concept,” whatever that may be, with Turkish officials any day now.
“After this is agreed upon, then we can discuss the details,” Xelil said.
In the meantime, they have instructed northern Syrian officials not to engage with the Assad regime, a difficult seat to take.
Even if the U.S. can cut a deal for additional forces, the Autonomous Administration must still confront near-Sisyphean tasks.
Much of Syria’s north lies in ruins from eight years of war, and there is no coherent plan to rebuild.
Trump unilaterally cancelled $230 million set aside for the endeavor last year. The president wants the rest of the Coalition to foot the bill, and U.S. officials say the $230 million has been replaced by pledges from Gulf nations. But the city of Raqqa, which was largely destroyed by Coalition airstrikes, alone needs some $5 billion, the city’s mayor said last autumn.
Apartment buildings near February 23 Street, Raqqa, Syria, July 25, 2018. Image: Gernas Maao/The Defense Post
Incidentally, the Saudis asked the U.S. government if Trump’s December withdrawal announcement meant they were off the financial hook (Trump’s subsequent tweet made it clear they were not).
The northern administration’s domestic legitimacy rests heavily on its ability to fight ISIS. With the caliphate gone, people will be looking for a return to normalcy.
“The SDF bring great security but it can still be hard to get basic goods. The situation is much better now than before, but we need help,” said Hassan, a shopkeeper in Tal Abyad.
Civilians who spoke to The Defense Post in Hasakah, Manbij, and other areas of northern Syria echoed similar sentiments. Whatever their opinions of the SDF, they feared the American withdrawal.
“We’re still living in a state of war,” Xelil said. “We need a number of services to be rebuilt. We’re deficient in municipal services, electricity, food distribution, healthcare. Syria in general is crushed.”
“The services in some other areas may be better, but our ambition is stronger,” Xelil said.
SDC officials have elicited the technical support of the Syrian regime in limited projects, but full reconstruction depends on a political settlement to the civil war.
And the Americans appear unwilling to offer that, likely in deference to Ankara’s long-standing opposition to the SDC’s participation in the U.N.-sponsored peace talks in Geneva.
“We need doors open for our participation in political operations,” a source with knowledge of the discussions told The Defense Post, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak on the matter.
Lack of reconstruction is a serious long-term security threat, former U.S. officials said.
A Raqqa Internal Security Force member guards an entrance to a courtyard in Raqqa, Syria, February 19, 2018. Image: US Army/Sgt. Travis Jones
In Deir Ezzor, especially, tribal grievances linger from the ISIS war and the destruction of the local oil economy by Coalition bombing.
“There is animosity towards the Kurds in some Arab areas for what is perceived as heavy-handed governance or the inequitable sharing of power and resources,” said Alexander Bick, who was Syria director in Barack Obama’s National Security Council.
“That’s a fairly combustible situation. Certainly something the Defense Department is well aware of, and has tried to address by pushing the SDF to be more inclusive, but there aren’t perfect solutions to it – particularly in the absence of resources, which this administration has decided not to put in.”
US support for the YPG
In retrospect, former U.S. officials who spoke to The Defense Post say roots of today’s crisis were sown from the beginning.
On the one hand, aligning with the YPG’s tactical goals has borne perhaps the most successful U.S. Special Forces train-and-assist mission to date.
But American officials ignored the gap between their and the YPG’s strategic goals for years, an oversight that now threatens to leave one of the world’s most vulnerable populations in what appears to be an intractable geostrategic crisis.
A YPJ fighter in Raqqa, Syria, October 2017. Image: YPJ/Twitter
Still, officials say, the decision to arm and support the YPG was not made lightly.
“They were problematic from a number of different angles,” a former official said, not simply for their roots in the PKK, which Turkey and its western allies have designated a terrorist organization.
For the Americans, however, the alternative was to accept a Turkish proposal to utilize Arab rebels “without even being shown evidence that these groups existed in sufficient numbers, organization, training to actually carry that out.”
The YPG was undoubtedly the most adept ground force available in northern Syria. And, two former officials said, its secular ideology proved an appealing antidote to the region’s toxic sectarianism.
“There are 20 million Sunni Arabs between Baghdad and Damascus who in important respects lack meaningful political representation in either country,” Bick said.
“So as long as this persists, we can and should expect radicalism to reemerge down the road.”
It was American planners who pushed a reluctant YPG to capture vast Arab-majority territories in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor.
“I think everybody [in Washington] recognized at the time that you didn’t want to be trying to govern large swaths of territory with Kurdish forces that would be perceived as outsiders,” Bick explained.
“We didn’t want a situation, strategically, where we’d be relying … exclusively on the Kurds.”
Hence the “snowball” method: As the YPG took territory, it absorbed local factions into a “professional coalition” – the Syrian Democratic Forces.
The challenge for the Obama administration was how to leverage the YPG’s military and organizational abilities against ISIS while ensuring that the burgeoning alliance was constituted in a way that would minimize intercommunal tensions after the war.
“We worried about all of those issues,” Bick said.
“The question is not was the choice perfect, but what were the other choices?”
“Did we think about it? Yes. Did we come up with a satisfactory answer to it? No,” he said.
“Did we think that getting ISIS out was a sufficiently important priority for the United States that we would, to some extent, have to fly the plane as we built it? Yes.”
The consequences of that decision have come home to roost. Turkey’s position on the YPG shifted fiercely after the U.S. in 2016 pushed the group to capture from ISIS the majority-Arab city of Manbij, near the Turkish border.
“It’s probably the most complex security situation, fighting situation I’ve seen in over four decades of dealing with – with fights,” then Defense Secretary James Mattis said in February 2018 when asked about Turkey’s position on Manbij.
“And it is one where I believe we are finding common ground and there are areas of uncommon ground where sometimes war just gives you bad alternatives to choose from.”
US and Turkish forces conduct a convoy during a joint combined patrol near Manbij, Syria, November 8, 2018. image: US Army/Spc. Zoe Garbarino
The U.S. did not have a coherent Syria policy until at least early 2018 – a year into Trump’s presidency – a former official with knowledge of the matter said.
“As the terrain changed, they moved … You end up at a place based on one decision, one decision, one more,” the official told The Defense Post on the condition of anonymity.
“There were people saying, ‘We can stop this anytime we want.’ No, you can’t,” the former official said. “If you go in here and you start doing this, you own this problem.”
The Trump administration finally pronounced a Syria plan to Congress in January 2018, after the SDF had largely captured the country’s north.
American troops would continue to occupy the country’s resource-rich territories while the Treasury Department would economically isolate the Syrian regime to bring Assad to the Geneva negotiating table, David Satterfield, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary at the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, told a baffled senators in a chaotic hearing.
Just five weeks later, Trump began suggesting it was about time to pull the plug. In his December phone call with Erdogan, he tanked the whole policy.
“No prom queen aspires to be a crack whore. But some end up there through incremental bad decision-making,” the former official said.
With or without the Americans, the war is not over for the SDF.
Back in Baghuz, I caught one of Salaheddin’s young recruits in the stairwell of the safe house and asked what comes next for him after this battle.
He responded excitedly, “I’ll go to Efrin.”
I felt a bolt of sympathy for the kid. “You’re from Efrin?” He looked no older than 19.
He glanced over my shoulder, smile intact. “No, I’m from the graveyard of ISIS.” Kobane.
A plume of smoke rises near a village after bombs were dropped by aircraft as Turkey’s military began Operation Olive Branch against the Kurd-controlled Efrin region in Syria, January 20, 2018. Image: trthaber/Twitter
“We’ll go wherever the revolution is needed,” said a European YPJ volunteer, who gave her name as Cude, later that afternoon on the roof.
“We will take back Efrin, we will keep our liberated area and when we are finished with Rojava, we will liberate all the other oppressed areas,” she proudly told me.
No decision to widen operations against Turkey-backed Islamist rebels in Efrin has yet been made, Xelil emphasized. But covert operations and military preparations, he said, are “always being made.”
The SDF declared in February that, though it prefers dialogue with Turkey, it intends to retake Efrin and facilitate the return of its population in the post-ISIS stage.
Efrin is surrounded, Xelil said, and Russian and Syrian regime troops have been interdicting attempted YPG deployments, so any future operations depend in part on those actors.
“I think the end of Baghuz and military victory over ISIS will greatly ease matters regarding Efrin,” Xelil said.
The Americans reportedly censured the YPG for its insurgency tactics there in late 2018.
How the YPG’s ambitions may impact U.S. efforts to make nice between their partner force and NATO ally to the north was of little concern, Xelil said.
Baghuz, Syria after it was deserted by thousands of ISIS fighters and their families in March 2019. Image: Jared Szuba for The Defense Post
Northern Syrian leaders expressed profound gratitude for the support of the Americans, but Xelil said Efrin was their decision to make.
“If [the Americans] get involved, we’ll say why didn’t you get involved when Turkey attacked us?”
In Baghuz, SDF fighters were of the same mind. “If America leaves, nothing changes. We will resist,” Cude said. It was a uniform refrain.
“No one asked [the Americans] to come, no one will ask them to stay,” she said, adding, “I don’t know who to trust less, Trump or Erdogan or Putin.”
Asked if she was prepared to fight the Turkish Army or the Syrian regime, she hesitated. “I don’t know. If it’s necessary? Yeah.”
She was hopeful that a deal with Damascus would secure the north’s autonomy.
“You cannot make war all the time. You must make compromises sometimes,” she said.
Without the Americans, “it’s going to be harder, [but] we will fight until the end.”
“If we lose, we will lose fighting. There can be no surrender.”
SDF fighters near Baghuz, Syria in March 2019. Image: Jared Szuba for The Defense Post
Around midnight, back at al-Omar oilfield, some 50 miles north across the desert from Baghuz, I hunched over the embers of a dying campfire.
Two SDF fighters emerged from the darkness and sat next to me. One placed a tin pot on the coals to boil coffee, and offered me some.
The pair chatted in Kurdish for a while. Then one stood up from his chair, walked to a nearby pickup truck, and plugged his smartphone into the audio system.
A haunting Kurdish song played, one I had heard before on the road to Deir Ezzor. I asked what the words meant.
He was silent for nearly a minute, then said in Arabic, “Bombing of villages in Qandil. Turkey, about 15 years ago,” he said.
“For no reason,” he added.
We sat for several minutes in silence. One fighter rose, said goodnight, and walked away.
After some time I asked the other if he thought the Americans would stay. ”They’ll stay. They reversed the decision,” he said.
“But if you go to Efrin, won’t that make the Americans’ diplomatic efforts harder?”
He let out a long drag of his cigarette with a sigh. “God, I don’t know.” He extended his legs and planted the heels of his combat boots at the edge of the fire.
The song ended, and the officer tossed back the last of his coffee. He stood up, and took his phone from the truck.
“Sleep well. Hope to see you again.”
“Inshahallah,” I answered.
He took several paces towards the barracks then stopped. “Inshahallah after Efrin.”
American artillery thudded flatly in the distance.
ISIS’s ‘caliphate’ was crushed. Now Syria’s Kurd-led alliance faces bigger battles
Challenges after the elimination of ISIS
Although defeated on the battlefield, ISIS will continue to be a threat to stability in Syria, SDF commander-in-chief General Mazlum Kobane writes
YPJ fighters screen women and children from ISIS-held camps in Baghuz, Syria. Image: Mutlu Civiroglu
The final chapter of Islamic State has been completed successfully with the liberation of the town of Baghuz from the terrorist organization. After civilians were evacuated and hundreds of extremists surrendered, the Syrian Democratic Forces, with the participation of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, put up a strong fight against the last remnants of the terrorist organization and declared to the world the destruction of the so-called caliphate.
There is no doubt that the elimination of the terrorist organization’s territory was the result of great efforts and sacrifice by SDF forces and the Coalition. High-level coordination between the parties and their strong ties will soon bring an end to the nightmare that has enveloped the entire world and turned the region into a terrorist epicenter.
Rojda Felat, who commanded the battle against ISIS in Raqqa, surveys a flank of Tal al-Samam with other SDF commanders. Image: ©Joey L./JoeyL.com/Used with permission
The joint decisions made by the SDF and Coalition forces made the liberation of city after city possible while civilian casualties were avoided by employing precise and controlled military tactics.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to leave some U.S. forces in Syria is very crucial for the next phase of the fight against ISIS, which involves uprooting its intellectual and ideological roots, requiring continuous and long-term work.
American political and military leadership, as well as members of the U.S. Congress, agree that the threat ISIS poses is far from being completely eliminated. By keeping U.S. forces in the region and rearranging the American strategy, the next phase of the fight against terror will help the SDF to preserve the gains made so far.
General Mazlum Kobane, Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces discusses plans to liberate the final ISIS pockets in eastern Syria with US Army Lieutenant Gen. Paul E. Funk, then Commander of Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, during a meeting near Ayn Issa, Syria, August 21, 2018. Image: US Army/Staff Sgt. Brigitte Morgan
We want to emphasize the role of the U.S. Department of Defense, and especially the commander of CENTCOM General Joseph Votel, in the territorial victory against ISIS and for ensuring security and stability in the areas liberated from the darkness. We thank him for his leadership and the important role he played in this historic achievement.
Brett McGurk, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, alongside U.S. Army Maj. Gen. James B. Jarrard, Commanding General of Special Operations Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve during a visit to Raqqa, Syria in 2018. Image: Sgt. Brigitte Morgan/US Army
We also want to acknowledge important role of the former Presidential Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS Brett McGurk in this victory, and thank him for bringing together different nations under the international Coalition and building a bridge between them and the SDF.
Though the structure of ISIS will come to an end, we also want to draw attention to some major challenges that are ahead of us: sleeper cells planted by the terrorist organization, and the danger in ISIS’s ability to reorganize itself by employing tactics of individual terrorist acts such as bombings and assassinations.
In addition, the vacuum of power left after ISIS and the partial withdrawal of U.S. forces will be undoubtedly be exploited by regional and international parties.
Remains of the ISIS tent city near Baghuz, Syria. Image: Mutlu Civiroglu
There is also a growing need to restore cohesion of the community and to reorganize and return people to their communities. The areas the terrorists occupied have been turned into ruins and must be revived. This revitalization will require continued support and rehabilitation at all levels so that citizens can return to their normal lives.
In accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations, the continued cooperation between the SDF and the international Coalition to counter ISIS, led by the United States of America, will contribute to the end of the Syrian crisis. The social component and diversity of our free areas constitutes the first point toward the ultimate goal of a democratic Syria, free from all forms of terrorism.
General Mazlum Abdi is the Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces.
All views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or positions of The Defense Post.
The distant dream of a secure safe zone in northern Syria
On January 13, U.S. President Donald Trump proposed, in an ambiguous tweet, the creation of a 20-mile safe zone in northern Syria.
Almost 10 days later there is still considerable confusion over what exactly it means and how it might be implemented. The Turkish government wants the area cleared of Syrian Kurdish forces, for instance, while Syrian Kurds oppose any Turkish role. And will it be primarily a Turkish venture, or might the United States spearhead its creation?
Ankara’s preferred safe zone is one that is free of the People’s Protection Units (YPG), Syrian Kurdish fighters that make up the bulk of the multi-ethnic Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that with U.S. help have largely defeated Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria. The Turkish government says the YPG is as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) that has been fighting for Kurdish self-rule inside Turkey since 1984.
“The leaks about the buffer zone are unworkable,” Aaron Stein, director of the Middle East programme at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, told Ahval News. “This is going to be fraught and tenuous.”
“I have a hard time accepting why the SDF would choose the U.S. proposal over the [Syrian] regime alternative, and how Moscow could then blow all this up,” he said, referring to talks the Syrian Kurds began with Damascus following Trump’s Dec. 19 announcement he was pulling the U.S.’ 2,000 troops from Syria. The Kurds hope that by ceding their border regions with Turkey to Damascus they can prevent President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s threatened offensive.
Syrian Kurdish authorities have affirmed they will support the creation of a buffer zone if established and run by the United Nations or the U.S.-led coalition. But UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres said the UN had no plans to participate in the creation of such a safe zone.
The Kurds adamantly oppose any Turkish involvement in the safe zone.
“We really need a safe zone, but without Turkish fingers,” Salih Muslim, former co-leader of the political wing of the YPG, told Kurdistan 24. “We want a safe area with an air embargo. There must be no role for Turkey.”
Any safe zone that is 20-miles deep along the northern Syrian border would include all the major Kurdish cities in Syria.
“The problem with the buffer zone is that there is little information on how the U.S. expects to keep Turkey from attacking and destroying the SDF,” said Nicholas Heras, Middle East Security Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. “This is the heart of the matter because Turkey’s vision for the buffer zone is for the Turkish military to control the major Kurdish population centres in northeast Syria.”
“A large component of the SDF comes from these Kurdish areas, and it is to be expected that the SDF would fight Turkey, rather than be dismantled by it,” he said. “The buffer zone concept was supposed to achieve a deal between Turkey and the SDF that allows for power sharing in northeast Syria, as a way to prevent disastrous conflict between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds. Any plan to allow Turkey to control the Kurdish areas of northeast Syria will force the SDF into conflict with Turkey because the SDF is existentially threatened by Turkey.”
Heras said the SDF was trying to reach an agreement with Russia and Syrian President Bashar Assad to prevent Turkey seizing land in Syria.
Yaşar Yakış, a Turkish former foreign minister, believes the terms buffer/safe zone are vague.
“A safe zone as it is conceived by Turkey is difficult to set up in northeast Syria. Russia, Iran, the U.S. and many members of the international community will have to be persuaded for it,” Yakış said.
He said Turkey had no means of persuading the SDF to peacefully leave the area.
“However, it may dare to achieve it by using its military power, without persuasion,” Yakış suggested. “If Turkey succeeds in persuading the U.S., Washington has the means to force the YPG to establish a safe zone. But if this is going to be a safe zone with international legitimacy, it has to be sanctioned by a U.N. Security Council resolution, which means that the permanent members of the Security Council – Russia, China, France and the UK – also have to be persuaded.”
Turkey fears the creation of a safe zone similar to the one in northern Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War, which led to Iraqi Kurds achieving autonomy, he said.
“This will be considered a nightmare by Turkey, as it is vehemently opposed to the emergence of any type of Kurdish entity in the north of Syria,” Yakış said.
Mutlu Civiroglu, a Syria and Kurdish affairs analyst, said Trump’s tweet suggested a preference for protecting Syrian Kurds before mentioning the 20-mile safe zone.
“It’s not clear what it really means,” he said. “Assuming the buffer zone is something the U.S. is going to initiate to protect Kurds, that would be positive and would be accepted by Kurds and their allies.”
Russia could stymie the creation of such a zone though, Civiroglu said.
“Moscow can certainly undermine not only this safe zone, but also any development in Syria since it has the power,” he said. “Its move will depend on the details. Russia has the power and capability of preventing or shaping the steps taken by Turkey, the Syrian government and any other player.”
Mustafa Gurbuz, a non-resident fellow at the Arab Center in Washington, said the United States had engaged in dual discourse by promising Turkey a safe zone along its southern border on the one hand and promising Syrian Kurds protection from any potential Turkish attack on the other.
“YPG leaders will not retreat in a silent matter,” he said. “The YPG will exploit U.S.-Russia competition to prevent the Turkish safe zone and, in the case of Turkey-Russia agreement, may use its ties with the Assad regime. Thus, it’s a troubling case for Turkey.”
GAZETECİ/ANALİST ÇİVİROĞLU YORUMLADI “Erdoğan’ın Bolton’ı Kabul Etmemesi İki Taraf Arasındaki Sorunların Derinliğini Gösteriyor”
Washington’da yaşayan gazeteci/analist Mutlu Çiviroğlu, ABD Ulusal Güvenlik Danışmanı Bolton’ın Ankara ziyaretini ve ABD’de Trump’ın çekilme kararı sonrası yaşanan istifaları bianet’e yorumladı.
Washington’da yaşayan gazeteci/analist Mutlu Çiviroğlu, Trump’un ABD askerlerini Suriye’den çekme kararının ardından yaşananları, Beyaz Saray Ulusal Güvenlik Danışmanı John Bolton’ın İsrail sonrası Türkiye ziyareti öncesi yaptığı açıklamaları yorumladı.
Çiviroğlu, Erdoğan’ın Bolton’ı kabul etmemesi ve Bolton’ın Türkiye’den ayrılması üzerine röportajdan bir gün sonra bize ilettiği ek görüşte ise bunun “ABD-Türkiye arasındaki sorunların derinliğini gösterdiğini” söyledi.
Çiviroğlu, Trump’ın çekilme kararının ABD’nin kutuplaşmış ortamında tüm taraflardan tepki aldığını söylerken, ABD Genelkurmay Başkanı General Joseph Dunford ve Bolton’ın Türkiye ziyaretinde öncelikli olarak Kürtlerin konuşulacağını vurguladı. Çiviroğlu’na göre ABD ile Türkiye arasındaki ilişkiler, görünenden derin sorunlar barındırıyor.
Rusya ise Kürtlerin statüsüyle ilgili Suriye yönetimini ikna etme aşamasında.
Bolton’ın Türkiye ziyaretini nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz? Ziyaret öncesi İsrail’de Kürtlerle ilgili uyarıda bulunacağını söyledi. ABD benzeri yönde başka söylemlerde de bulundu, bunlar mı görüşülüyor şu anda?
Bolton’ın Türkiye ziyareti, İsrail’den Türkiye’ye geçmesi önemli. Trump’ın üç hafta önce aniden aldığı Suriye’den çekilme kararının takip edilmesi, görüşülmesi açısından önemli öncelikle.
Çünkü o kararın yankıları hala sürüyor, hem ABD kamuoyunda, hem Trump yönetimi içerisinde, hem kongrede, hem senatoda, think tank’lerde yarattığı tartışma süregeliyor.
Trump’ın Erdoğan ile yaptığı telefon görüşmesinde bir bakıma IŞİD ile savaşı Türkiye’ye havale etme niyetiyle bu kararı almış olabileceği ABD basınında sıkça dile getirildi.
Bolton’ın ziyareti bu telefon görüşmesinde tartışılan konuların daha somut bir şekilde tartışılması hem de Türkiye’nin olası rolünün, rolü olursa nasıl olacağının konuşulması bakımından önemli.
“ABD’deki tüm kutuplar çekilme kararını eleştiriyor”
Ama en önemli konu Kürtler’e bakış açısı. Amerikan kamuoyunda çok büyük bir rahatsızlık var. Trump’ın kararının askerlere danışılmadan aldığı, Kürtler’i yüz üstü bıraktığı, Kürtlerin ABD’nin müttefiki olduğu, kimsenin ortaya çıkmadığı bir dönemde IŞİD ile savaştıkları hem Demokratlar hem Cumhuriyetçiler tarafından dile getiriliyor.
ABD gibi kutuplu bir toplumda her iki kesim de bu eleştirileri getiriyor.
Özellikle Trump’a getirilen eleştiri Kürtler üzerinden yoğunlaşmakta. Cumhuriyetçi Senatör Marco Rubio’nun “Bu karar yeni yetişmekte oluşan Kürt gençleri ABD’ye karşı nefretle dolduracaktır. Bizim yaptığımız Kürtler’e ihanettir” gibi bir açıklama yaptı.
Senatör Lindsey Graham’ın başını çektiği grup, Demokratlar da var içinde, genel olarak kamuoyu bu ani çekilme kararının Kürtler’i Erdoğan’a karşı çok savunmasız bırakacağını düşünüyor.
Türkiye’nin operasyonuyla karşı karşıya bırakmanın savunulamaz olduğu düşünülüyor.
Geçenlerde John Kirby (Pentagon Eski Sözcüsü) CNN’e yaptığı açıklamada, Türkiye’nin Afrin’deki insan hakları ihlallerine vurgu yaparak aynısının olabileceğini ifade etmişti.
ABD’deki bu hassasiyetle ilgili konuşulması, Türkiye’nin Kürtler’e, Kürtler’in kontrolündeki bölgelere karşı herhangi bir operasyon yapmaması gerektiği vurgulanabilir bu buluşmada.
Pompeo da geçenlerde “Kürtlerin katledilmesinin önüne geçilmeli” gibi güçlü bir kelime kullandı. Pompeo ve Bolton hükümet içerisinde İran karşıtı, Türkiye’ye karşı sert tutumları olan isimler.
Bolton’ın asıl amacı Kürtler konusunda ABD’nin hassasiyetini göstermek. ABD hükümetine dayatılan, bu çekilme kararının yaratacağı olası sonuçların iletilmesi konusunda önemli.
Bolton’dan önce de Graham gibi TRump’a yakın isimler bu çekilmenin zamana yayılacağı konusunda ipucu vermekteler.
O nedenle ABD’nin bu konuda ısrarcı olacağını söylemek pek de hayalci olmaz.
“Çekilme konusu bulanık”
Çekilme konusu giderek bulanıklaşmaya başladı, ya da öyle mi yansıtılıyor? Çekilme kararı sonrası inisiyatif Türkiye’ye ne kadar kalır? Bugün Trump’ın “Türkiye bizim kadar olmasa da IŞİD’den nefret ediyor” şeklinde bir başka ‘tuhaf’ açıklaması da oldu?
Çekilme konusu tabii bulanık. Trump kamuoyunda her aklına geleni söylemesiyle tanınan bir başkan. Kendi muhalifleri bunu “Refleksle hareket eden bir başkan” olarak isimlendirip, tepki gösteriyorlar.
Zaten Mattis’in, McGurk ve Sweney’in istifaları bu kararın hükümetin kararı olmadığını, bireysel bir karar olduğunu ortaya koyuyor. Üç haftalık süreç içerisinde bu daha iyi görüldü.
Trump’ın etrafında politikayı belirleyen isimlerin ağırlıklarını koymasıyla beraber Trump da bu noktada sinyaller verdi, “Ben takvim vermemiştim” şeklinde açıklamaları oldu. Yani bu çekilme açıklamasıyla ilgili “damage control” (hasar kontrol) çalışmaları sürmekte ama çekilme Trump’ın seçim kampanyasında da belirttiği bir konuydu. Danışılmadan yapılması tepki yarattı. Ama bu siyasetten dönülüyor, çekilinse bile bazı birliklerin daha uzun süre kalacağı da konuşuluyor. Böyle bir opsiyon muhtemel.
Öte yandan Türkiye’nin Suriye’de IŞİD’e karşı rol oynayacağını, konunun uzmanları dahil hiç kimse anlayabilmiş değil. Çünkü IŞİD’in şu anda bulunduğu nokta ile Türkiye arasındaki sınır yüzlerce kilometre.
“IŞİD ile mücadelenin Türkiye’ye bırakılması gerçekçi değil”
Buradan geçmesi için Suriye Demokratik Güçleri’nin (SDG) kontrol ettiği yerlerden geçmesi lazım ki bu ne pratik ne de gerçekçi.
Ayrıca zaten YPG’nin başını çektiği SDG, IŞİD’e karşı çok yoğun bir savaş sürdürmekte. En son Cumartesi günkü çatışmada iki İngiliz askeri yaralandı. Yani İngiliz askeri ve SDG yan yana savaşıyor IŞİD’e karşı, bu da önemli bir ayrıntı.
Yani böyle bir şey varken Türkiye’nin IŞİD’e karşı rol almasını beklemek gerçekçi değil, zaten Washington’da da bunun pek karşılığı yok. ABD basınında da birkaç gündür Türkiye’nin maddi ve manevi taleplerle böyle bir hava yaratması eleştiriliyor.
“Kürtlerin talepleri rol sahibi olmak”
Kürtler ve Esad’ın yaz aylarından beri gündeme gelen anlaşma iddialarını nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz? Bölgede kartlar yeniden karılıyor klişesi şu an için geçerli mi?
Kürtler Suriye’nin bir parçasılar, Suriye’deki en büyük etnik azınlıklar. Suriye’nin en güçsüz olduğu zamanda bile hiç Suriye’yi terk etmeyi düşünmediler.
Kendi projeleri hep Suriye dahilinde kendi federasyonlarının olması, yani yerel yönetimlerinin güçlendirilmesi. Şam’daki demir yumruğun kaldırılması, insanların kendi kimliği, kendi renkleriyle yaşamasına izin verilmesi.
O nedenle de mümkün olduğu kadar Suriye hükümetiyle çatışmadan çekinildi, yeri geldi Halep gibi bazı bölgelerde destek de sunuldu.
Gelinen noktada Suriye hükümeti, Suriye’nin meşru yönetimi, o sebeple Kürtler her zaman Suriye hükümetiyle anlaşmadan yana, ama benim Rojava’daki siyasiler, askeri temsilciler ve sıradan insanlarla yaptığım görüşmelerde rejimden bir değişim beklendiği, rejimin Kürtler’in Suriye’nin toprak bütünlüğüne katkılarının takdir edilmesi gerektiği, IŞİD, El Nusra ve benzeri cihatçı örgütlere karşı savaşının görülmesi, Kürtler ve müttefiklerinin taleplerine saygı gösterilmesi, yerine getirilmesi gibi talepler var.
Ancak hükümette geçen sekiz yıllık savaşa, yıkıma rağmen fazla olumlu değişiklik görülmüyor. Kürtlerin istemlerine olumlu yaklaşılmamakla birlikte sert tepkiler veriliyor.
Kürtlerin istediği Suriye’nin geleceğinde rol sahibi olmak. Malumunuz Kürtler onlarca yıldır ülkenin en büyük azınlığı olarak her türlü haktan mahrum olarak yaşadılar.
Kürtler artık bunu kabul etmek istemiyor, bunun böyle olmaması gerektiğini söylüyor. Kürtlerin on bine yakın kadın ve erkek kayıpları var, özellikle bu cihatçılara karşı.
Kürtlerin istediği kendi dillerinin, varlıklarının anayasal güvence altına alınması, kendi bölgelerini kendilerinin yönetmesi. Kürtlerin, Süryanilerin, bölgedeki Arapların, Ezidi Kürtlerin istemi bu.
“Rusya Suriye yönetimini ikna ediyor”
Eğer Suriye hükümeti biraz geçmişten ders çıkarırsa, Suriye’nin çok renkli, kültürlü yapısına bağlı olarak Kürtlerin isteklerine önem verirse sorunlar çözülmeyecek gibi değil. Benim gördüğüm hükümet bugüne kadar buna yanaşmamaktaydı. Ama son dönemlerde bu tür görüşmeler devam ediyor.
Rusya’nın da ara bulucu olduğu konusunda görüşler var. Rusya’nın kendisi de federasyon yönetimi. Suriye yönetimini ikna etmeye yakın olduğu yorumları yapılmakta. O nedenle Kürtler ve Esad’ın oturup konuşması sürpriz değil. Bu da olumlu bir şey. Suriye sekiz yıldan beri çok büyük bir yıkım yaşadı. Binlerce insan öldü, milyonlarcası evinden barkından oldu.
“ABD-Türkiye ilişkileri iyileşmedi”
Brunson krizinin ardından yaşanan iki ülke açısından tamamen ‘iyileşen’ ilişkiler dönemi mi, bu İran ile ne kadar bağlantılı?
Tamamen iyileşen ilişkiler olduğuna katılmıyorum. Amerika ve Türkiye arasında çok ciddi sorunlar var. Bu sorunlar da kolay kolay çözülecek sorunlar değil. Çünkü ciddi.
İran bunun sadece bir bağlamı. Kürtler konusu, Suriye konusu, İran, Halkbank, S-400 füzeleri, pek çok sorun var. Bu kolay kolay çözülmez ama Trump’ın Brunson’dan sonra baskıyı hafiflettiği görülüyor.
Bu çekilme konusunda Trump’ın Erdoğan ile yaptığı konuşma sonrası ABD medyası bu konuda hem fikir. ABD kamuoyu da çekilme kararında Erdoğan’ın rolü olduğuna inanıyor. Ama öte yandan Bolton’ın Türkiye’ye olumsuz bir bakış açısı da, Pompeo’nun bakan olmadan önce yaptığı açıklamalar da biliniyor.
Hükümet içerisinde Trump gibi düşünmeyen insanlar olduğu da biliniyor. Türkiye’nin cihatçılara karşı yeterince çaba göstermediği, Türkiye’nin Kürtlere karşı sert politikalar yürüttüğü, şu anda da asıl amacının IŞİD ile savaş olmadığı, Kürtler’i ezmek olduğu dile getiriliyor. Böyle bakıldığında temiz bir sayfa açılmış değil.
İran önemli, Bolton ve Pompeo’nun başını çektiği grup İran’a politikaların sertleşmesi gerektiğine inanıyorlar. Türkiye’nin de İran ilişkileri biliniyor. Orta vadede ben ilişkilerin iyi olacağı ya da şu anda iyileştiği fikrine katılmıyorum. (PT)