Kurdish-Arab Rebel Alliance May be Key to Obama’s Syrian Strategy

*Kurdish-Arab Rebel Alliance May be Key to Obama’s Syrian Strategy

YPG_FSA_Kobane

By Mutlu Civiroglu and Wladimir Van Wilgenburg

Now that the anti-ISIS coalition has struck Raqqa in Syria, it must seriously consider the Kurds as its most effective on the ground partners. The Obama administration needs local partners in Iraq and Syria to fight against the jihadist group, the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS, ISIL, or the Islamic State) if it hopes to maintain any gains resulting from its attacks on ISIS positions.

A spokesperson of the main Kurdish armed group in Syria highlighted the importance of Kurdish assets. “Whoever wants to destroy ISIS should take YPG into consideration. Let me say clearly that any strategy in Syria without YPG is doomed to fail,” the People’s Protection Units (YPG) spokesperson Polat Can said in our interview with him. Given the Kurds’ extensive experience and professionalism, they represent the best the best chance to revitalize a beleaguered Syrian resistance and help President Obama achieve his objectives.

In his September 10 speech, President Obama ruled out the Assad regime as a partner in fighting ISIS and emphasized strengthening the Syrian opposition. “We must strengthen the opposition as the best counterweight to extremists like ISIL, while pursuing the political solution necessary to solve Syria’s crisis once and for all,” he said. While admirable that the president choose not to work with a man whose preferred strategy involves bombing his own civilian population, it leaves a dearth of effective partners on the ground. However, in Syria—just as in Iraq—cooperation between Kurds and Arabs could play a key role in eliminating ISIS. US Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey recognized the fact that Kurds constitute an important part of Obama’s new strategy to fight ISIS.

Although Iraq has witnessed firsthand the effects of ISIS-induced instability, neighboring Syria has suffered far more with the advances and atrocities of the extremist group. ISIS has succeeded in wiping out many Syrian nationalist armed groups that comprise the bulk of moderate anti-Assad opposition. Both the moderate Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the Kurds have faced attacks by ISIS, leading to incredibly large refugee flows into Turkey.

Nonetheless, the Kurdish YPG forces have successfully fought ISIS and won most of its battles in both Iraq and Syria. Not only was the YPG an asset in the rescue operation for thousands of Yezidis fleeing from Iraq’s Sinjar, it also secured a wide area in northern Syria from the Kurdish city of Afrin to Yarubiya, a town border to Iraq, despite the extremist push against Kurdish villages. These regions maintain relative stability compared to other parts of Syria, allowing Kurds, Arabs, and Christians to live peacefully together, thanks in large part to the ability of the YPG to keep a modicum of security.

Western diplomats have traditionally been reluctant to meet the PYD for their ties to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), viewed as a terrorist group in the United States and Turkey. After successful operations against ISIS extremists, however, both countries have begun reevaluating their positions towards it. The Wall Street Journal reported that US officials recognize the fact that Kurdish fighters in Syria may play a critical role in the campaign against ISIS, and have conducted talks with Syrian Kurds. The success of the YPG also prompted Turkish journalist Amberin Zaman to write about how the fight against ISIS has given the YPG and the PKK more legitimacy.

For their part, the Syrian Kurds have not only expressed interest and enthusiasm in pursuing Obama strategy against ISIS, they have already laid the groundwork for cooperation with Syrian nationalists. In an interview with Voice of America (VOA), YPG Spokesman Polat Can said, “We are the most experienced military force fighting against IS, and we are willing to actively participate in the international coalition. We are currently meeting many countries on this issue including with those who are decision makers.”

As the YPG continue its fight against ISIS on several fronts, it hosted a former rival on August 22. FSA Colonel Abdul Jabbar al-Oqaidi sought to mend fences with the Kurds by meeting YPG commander with General Commander of YPG Sipan Hemo in the Kurdish city of Afrin, north of Aleppo. Al-Oqaidi, the former head of the FSA’s military council in Aleppo, initially angered the Kurds by fighting jointly with Islamist groups against the Kurds in Aleppo. The FSA said it attacked the YPG for supporting Assad. Kurds allege this led to the killing of nineteen Kurdish civilians and the kidnapping of at least 400 others by the various rebel groups.

But in January last year, alliances started to change, when the Free Syrian Army clashed with ISIS, and lost huge swaths of territory in Syria, including Raqqa and the oil fields in Deir Ezzor. This led new cooperation between rebel groups and the Kurds, resulting in an agreement between the YPG and the Ahl as-Sham operation room in April last year to fight ISIS in Aleppo, and to cooperate against Assad. On August 22, al-Akidi and an FSA-delegation apologized for the FSA’s past mistakes, saying that Kurds, Christians, and Arabs, should work for the overthrow of the Syrian regime. “We want to work with the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) and the FSA if they accept the rights of Kurdish people and correct past mistakes,” Hemo said in a video.

In an exclusive interview, the Defense Minister of local Afrin Canton government Abdo Chilo, who took part in the meeting between the YPG and the FSA in Afrin, also told the Atlantic Council that the FSA wants to open a new page with the Kurds. “We told him we accepted his apology and we valued his visit. He realizes the power of YPG and wants closer relations with us, something we have long desired as well.”

The Kurds appear ready to fight alongside any secular group that will work for a pluralistic and democratic Syria against ISIS and the Assad regime. “We value Akidi’s visit and his request of help from YPG. It shows his willingness to work and create something good. We are ready to form a joint front with FSA and work against IS thugs and the brutal Assad regime,” Chilo added.

YPG spokesman Polat Can told Turkey’s daily Radikal that they are ready to work with anyone who is willing to fight against ISIS. “It has been over two years that we have been fighting against ISIS and like-minded extremist groups. We are keen on collaborating with moderate that respect to democracy, human rights and accept our national rights as Kurds.”

This historic meeting signifies a major starting point for effective cooperation against ISIS as well as the Assad regime. The meeting led to the formation of a new joint FSA-YPG operations room named “Euphrates Volcano” on September 10 in Kobane, which will carry out operations in areas surrounding Kobane, including the ISIS-stronghold of Raqqah. One day after its formation, the joint operation room carried out its first attack against ISIS in Qara Qawzak.

Abdurrahman Saleh, a spokesperson for ISIS, confirmed in our interview with him an alliance between Syrian anti-Assad rebels and Kurds, but suggested it to be a local alliance rather than a cohesive policy. “Some battalions of al-Tawheed brigade in Aleppo cooperate with the YPG against ISIS, but I do not know if this is a general decision, or a specific case. It may be a local agreement, rather than an overall strategy,” he said.

The new rebel alliance between the Kurds and the FSA could provide a determining factor to stop the expansion of the ISIS caliphate. If the FSA and the YPG can maintain a joint front, it will likely have a major impact on the success of fight both the militant group and the Assad regime in the longer run. The YPG, with its experienced and skilled fighters and strong popular support can provide a morale boost for the secular and moderate Syrian opposition and be a determining factor in preventing ISIS expansion in Syria. For Obama and the anti-ISIS coalition, keeping the Kurds incentivized to be their boots on the ground will be the key to fighting this war.

Mutlu Civiroglu is a Kurdish affairs analyst focusing on Syria and Turkey. He has been closely monitoring YPG’s fight against IS and other jihadist groups. You can follow him on Twitter @mutludc

Wladimir van Wilgenburg is an analyst of Kurdish politics for the Jamestown Foundation and a contributing writer for Al-Monitor

* This article was originally published on Atlantic Council Website on September 23,  2014

Are Syrian Kurds Being Left Out in Geneva 2

 Are Syrian Kurds Being Left Out in Geneva 2?

Yesterday, Syrian Kurds said they would form an autonomous provincial government in Rojava, the Kurdish-language term for one of three majority-Kurdish regions in northeast Syria. The self-proclaimed government is complete with its own president and ministers. 

The move comes two months after the country’s Kurds declared self-rule. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said elections for the new municipal council would be held this spring.

The announcement comes as Kurds are left without representation at this week’s Montreux peace talks, a U.N.-backed gathering of Syrian opposition groups, government representatives and international powers.

“Kurds have been struggling for decades. Hundreds of activists were tortured by the regime,” says Mutlu Civiroglu, a Washington-based journalist and Kurdish affairs analyst focusing on Syria and Turkey. “Ignoring the Kurds has a symbolic meaning that the future of Syria will not be any different for Kurds.”

We asked Civiroglu, Wladimir van Wilgenburg, a Middle East Analyst for the Jamestown Foundation specializing in Kurdish politics and Dilshad Othman, a Syrian specialist in information security and a U.S State Department Internet Freedom fellow to weigh in on the consequences of Kurds being left out of this week’s negotiations.

Syria Deeply: What do Syrian Kurds want from the Geneva peace talks?

Wladimir van Wilgenburg: The main Kurdish parties want some kind of recognition of a Kurdish status in Syria. They want to have recognition for a form of self-rule over their own areas, such as autonomy, federalism or democratic autonomy. This is quite similar to what the Kurds in Iraq have. But the West wants the Syrian Kurds to be part of the Syrian opposition, or excluded from Geneva II. As a result, the Kurdish National Council, one of the main Kurdish power blocs, joined the Syrian Coalition due to Western pressure.

Now the PYD fears that their demands are not recognized and that it could turn out to be a second Lausanne that led to the creation of Turkey and the division of the Kurdish areas in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey, without granting them any form of Kurdish autonomy or independence, as promised by the earlier treaty of Sevres.

Mutlu Civiroglu: Two major Kurdish umbrella groups, the People’s Council of Western Kurdistan (PCWK) and the Syrian Kurdish National Council (SKNC), recently announced they had reached agreement on several key issues, including unified Kurdish participation at the Geneva II Conference. This joint delegation wasn’t recognized at Geneva. Kurdish activists now feel that their demands are ignored, and their voices are silenced.

Kurds want to participate in Geneva II as Kurds, the biggest ethnic minority in the country and one of the groups that has been fighting the regime’s repression for decades. Hundreds of activists were tortured by the regime. Ignoring the Kurds has a symbolic meaning, which is that the future of Syria will not be any different for Kurds.

Dishad Othman: Most Kurds want the right to independent political decisions. They want to play a strong part in any decision-making process.

Kurds are trying to bring their case to any table, even Geneva II. Kurds were also targeted in military attacks. Of course they want a role in the decision-making process. They want to know how they will be represented in the “new Syria.”

SD: Why are Kurdish interests being negated at the talks?

WW: It’s not seen as an important issue, and the U.S. thinks that the Kurds should negotiate Kurdish rights with the Syrian opposition, rather than imposing unilateral decisions on the ground and declaring autonomy.

Moreover, the United States wants to exclude PYD from the negotiations since the U.S. is closely allied to Turkey, which opposes PYD, and also since it considers PYD to be close to the Syrian regime and the United States also claims that it wants to preserve the territorial integrity of Syria. In Iraq, the United States prefers Baghdad over the Kurds, and in Syria, the U.S. also prefers the Syrian state over the Kurds (in this case, the Syrian opposition, or Assad).

The Kurds feel excluded and suggest that neither the Syrian opposition nor the Syrian government recognize any form of Kurdish autonomy, although Assad is flirting with the Kurds by allowing them the rights of education and giving them back Syrian citizenship. The Kurds want to have an independent delegation to push for Kurdish rights, instead of just discussing the future of Assad and a new government.

SD: What will be the consequences if Kurdish interests are ignored at the negotiating table?

WW: I doubt that the Geneva conference will lead to any solution since the main armed groups are not involved in the discussions, such as the Kurdish YPG militia, the Islamic front that is the biggest armed opposition group on the ground, or the FSA. Off course, al-Qaida-affiliated/inspired groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS are not invited, but they are also a significant power on the ground, and need to be dealt with somehow.

The Kurds want to have a say at the table, so if they do not have their own delegation, then Kurdish rights will most likely not be discussed, and the Kurdish “democratic autonomy” that was declared by PYD would not be recognized by the Syrian government, the Syrian opposition or the international community. Earlier, the Russians were willing to have the Supreme Kurdish Council to participate in Geneva II, but the Americans blocked it.

DO: The announcement of a autonomous administration in the northern part of Syria ahead of the Geneva talks is a direct reaction to Kurds not being invited to Geneva. They are sending a clear message that they are going to try and manage the area of northern Syria by themselves.

Kurds are waiting for a guarantee that their rights will be recognized on a political level. They are afraid of the new ideology and identity of the Syrian opposition. They are scared of the complexity of the battleground.

There is a lot to talk about at Geneva, especially in terms of the economy.  It used to be one of the strongest, but is now one of the poorest. There is a genuine fear that if the Kurds are not at the table, they will lose their rights and will be going on a path away from a united Syria.

MC: The core organizers of Geneva II rushed the conference and wanted to show the diplomatic community that international efforts were under way,  but unfortunately many groups are not represented at Geneva and by the Syrian National Coalition.

There will be one or two people at Geneva on behalf of the Syrian National Kurdish Council, but just like the Syrian National Council, they lack power on the ground among Kurds. Many colleagues I talk to said that this conference is born to be dead. This is a sad reality after three years.

Kurds are one of the largest minorities in Syria, and have a large presence in the Middle East. If there isn’t a solution to the Kurdish question, there won’t be stability in Iraq, Turkey and Syria. In Syria, Kurds have been the most organized militarily, socially, politically and economically. If you exclude the regime’s military power, the Kurds have the strongest army.

SD: If Kurds aren’t included in the decision-making process, how will they implement any agreements on the ground?

MC: I spoke to PYD’s leader and a member of SKNYC, and they both said they didn’t have a say in who represented them at Geneva, and that as a result they would not recognize the decisions made at Geneva. This is the risk that Geneva conference bears.

By excluding Kurds from Geneva, the international community is sending the message that Kurdistan is different from Syria, and that there isn’t a pluralistic Syria. This bolsters the feeling that Kurds are not a part of Syria’s future, and only further pushes them in a separate direction from Syria.

SD: How unified are the Kurdish political parties, and how does this translate on the ground?

MC: There is a consensus among Kurds that they have been highly successful in fighting extremist groups. The armed Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG) has been actively fighting radical groups like al-Nusra and ISIS. These efforts have largely been ignored by the international community.

It’s correct that you can’t see YPG as the military power that represents everyone, but there is an increasing consensus in the region that YPG is the defender of the Rojava region, and a general respect for their achievements in fighting extremism and keeping the region intact.

DO: Politically, Kurds are managing the area of northern Syria by themselves. Kurds don’t have a militia, except the PYD – the largest Kurdish militia, which isn’t in good shape with the Syrian opposition. There are a lot of small groups in the FSA. There are Kurds, but they don’t follow the Kurdish political routes – they get their funds from the Syrian opposition. Most Kurds are in Kobani and Afrin, controlled by PYD.

http://beta.syriadeeply.org/2014/01/syrian-kurds-left-montreux/

The Kurds and Geneva II

Wladimir van Wilgenburg, January 20, 2014

The Syrian Kurds have failed to get support from the United States and Russia to have an independent delegation for the upcoming Geneva II Syrian peace conference, slated to begin on January 22. They now fear that the Kurdish issue will be ignored in the conference, despite the fact that Kurds control a significant part of northern Syria, including many oil-producing areas.

At first it was unclear if the Syrian Kurdish political organizations could solve their differences, which have been exacerbated by tension between Kurdish groups in Iraq and Turkey. Competition between Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Massoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdistan region of Iraq, and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the main Kurdish party in Turkey, over the leadership of the Kurds, were at the core of the differences between Kurdish parties in Syria.

Regional Kurdish Disputes

The PKK backs the powerful Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and it’s armed wing, the People’s Defense Units (YPG), that control significant parts of the Kurdish areas in Syria. Its main rival, the Kurdish National Council (KNC), which brings together several Kurdish parties, is backed by Barzani.

Since 2011, the PYD has become the largest Kurdish party in Syria, as a result of its military power through the YPG. The KNC, on the other hand, has been increasingly marginalized as a result of its corresponding lack of military influence. Its leadership is now based outside of Syria and it has affiliated itself with the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, Syria’s main exile leadership, which is endorsed by several Western and Arab nations, as well as by the PKK’s and PYD’s main enemy, Turkey.

As I have previously written at Al Monitor, the KDP and PKK managed to solve some of their differences in December 2013, and they agreed that the Syrian Kurds should have a united voice in Geneva II as part of an independent Kurdish delegation. However, the National Coalition and several influential foreign nations have opposed the idea of a separate Kurdish delegation. In the end, it appears that only the Kurdish National Council (KNC) will go to Geneva II, as part of the National Coalition’s delegation—assuming the conference is held and the National Coalition attends—while the PYD is left out entirely.

PYD’s Plan for Kurdish Transitional Rule

The PYD argues that if the Kurds do not have an independent delegation at the Geneva II talks, there will be no recognition of special status for the Kurds in Syria. There is historical precedent for such fears, considering how the Kurdish national tragedy began in the 1920s. The PYD-leader Saleh Muslim Mohammed has warned of a repetition of the 1923 treaty of Lausanne that created a Turkish state and ignored the option of Kurdish independence that had been promised in the earlier treaty of Sèvres in 1920.

Ultimately, the PYD seeks international recognition for its plan to form a transitional Kurdish government in northern Syria, similar to the autonomous Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq. The West has so far opposed this idea, and it has been harshly criticized by the National Coalition. But for the PYD and many Syrian Kurds, it is of crucial importance. Having their own delegation at the talks would have allowed the PYD to raise this demand and bargain for its approval in the proceedings.

Turning the PYD Against Geneva

“There is frustration towards Washington, Moscow, and the UN,” says the Washington-based Kurdish affairs specialist Mutlu Civiroglu, who argues that Syrian Kurds now feel left out of the Geneva II process. “To provide the Kurdish point of view, Kurds should be there and they should be allowed to speak and raise their own demands. The Kurds have stopped radicals, protected their own areas, and protected ethnic minorities. Not allowing Kurds to come [in a separate Kurdish delegation], means that they want Kurds to live the same life as they did during Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s rule before the revolution.”

At the end of the day, the YPG is the clearly dominant military power in Syrian Kurdistan and the Geneva conference will not change the reality on the ground. Even the KNC realizes that the Kurdish issue will most likely not be discussed during Geneva II, and the PYD and its affiliates are turning hostile to the entire process.

On January 16, a pan-Kurdish body controlled by the PKK said that since the Geneva II meeting is “ostracizing” Syrian Kurds, its outcome “will not be recognized by the Kurds.” This hardening of the PKK’s position didn’t take long to filter down to its affiliates in Syria. Earlier on Monday, a PYD-affiliated organization threatened the KNC by saying that if it goes to Geneva without trying to secure “well-deserved Kurdish rights,” this “will be considered high treason against the Kurdish people and against all of Syria.”

It seems that after its demand for a separate Kurdish delegation was refused, the PYD has now decided to reject the Geneva II meeting entirely.

http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=54247